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 The GlobalGAP1  
Agni Kalfagianni and Doris Fuchs  
 
I Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the sustainability implications for the South of one of the 
most prominent private standards in food governance, the Global Partnership for Good 
Agricultural Practice (GlobalGAP). Specifically, the chapter employs a governance approach, 
focusing on the pivotal role of GlobalGAP in shaping rural livelihoods and sustainability 
objectives for the agriculture and food sector in developing countries.  In pursuit of its objectives, 
this chapter presents the evolving governance structures, aims and rhetoric of GlobalGAP, and 
evaluates its effectiveness and (perceived) legitimacy. The analysis aims to unravel the dynamics 
and conditions under which GlobalGAP can contribute to a more sustainable and equitable 
development of the food sector in the South.  
 
Food security, food safety and environmental sustainability are essential preconditions for the 
well-being of societies worldwide. The fulfilment of these conditions is particularly challenging 
for the global South, whose constant struggle with poverty, hunger and environmental degradation 
has been aggravated by contemporary events, such as the food crisis and the global economic 
downturn. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates that the 
number of people suffering from hunger and malnutrition rose to more than one billion in 2009, 
with women and children most seriously affected (FAO 2009). Global environmental challenges, 
in particular climate change, as well as pollution and water shortages, are expected to multiply 
threats to the provision of adequate amounts of nutritious and safe food (High Representative and 
EU Commission 2008). At the same time, hazardous environmental practices in agriculture also 
have negative health repercussions. Pesticide poisoning by farmers and rural workers, for 
instance, is a frequent phenomenon in developing countries, while legal provisions for workers’ 
health and safety are almost non-existent. In general, labour standards in agriculture tend to be 
extremely low.  
 
Private food governance promises to address these concerns on the basis of voluntary standards, 
corporate social responsibility initiatives and codes of conduct. GlobalGAP is a pivotal private 
standard that targets issues of food safety, as well as environmental and labour concerns. Against 
this background, the paper inquires into the potential of GlobalGAP for fostering sustainability 
objectives in the South. Given its increasing prominence, GlobalGAP can be a leading force in 
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reversing certain trends with respect to sustainability and/or exacerbating others. The paper also 
evaluates the legitimacy of GlobalGAP, both towards its stakeholders and the broader polity, in 
order to identify opportunities and constraints for a more participatory, transparent and 
accountable development of the food sector in the South.   
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, we provide a brief background on the origin of the 
GlobalGAP, lay out its instruments and governance structure, and explore changes that have 
occurred within the organization over time. Second, we evaluate the effectiveness of the initiative, 
both on its own terms and with respect to broader sustainability objectives and recognized 
international development standards. Third, we discuss existing criticism of the initiative and try 
to identify sources of potential shortcomings. We conclude by deriving policy recommendations 
and strategies for the improvement of the GlobalGAP from the perspective of developing 
countries. 
 
II. Background2 
Origin  
GlobalGAP is a private sector body that sets voluntary standards for the certification of 
agricultural products around the globe. It aims to establish one standard for Good Agricultural 
Practice (GAP.) with different product applications capable of fitting to the whole range of global 
conventional agricultural products. GlobalGAP is a pre-farm-gate standard, which means that the 
certificate covers the processing of the certified product from farm inputs like feed or seedlings 
and all the farming activities until the product leaves the farm. Moreover, it is a business-to-
business label not directly visible to consumers. 
The standard (first known as EurepGAP) was initiated in 1997 by retailers belonging to the Euro-
Retailer Produce Working Group (EUREP). The driving forces were British retailers in 
conjunction with supermarkets in continental Europe, who wanted to harmonize their own 
standards on product safety, as well as environmental well-being and labour welfare. More 
specifically, by the mid-1990s, most European supermarket chains created variations of 
“integrated crop management” (ICM) systems. This can be understood as an effort to reach 
consumers with preferences for sustainable products, without having to invest many resources in 
the niche organic market (Campbell and Le Heron 2007). As ICM was not based on any social 
movement defining a common set of standards, each supermarket created its own. This had 
negative consequences for suppliers, who had to undergo dozens of different audits for slightly 
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different standards. As a consequence, EurepGAP developed a harmonized set of good 
agricultural practice standards.   
Over the next decade, EurepGAP began to gain in global significance as a growing number of 
producers and retailers around the globe joined in. To reflect the new global status of the standard, 
EurepGAP was rebranded to GlobalGAP, at the 8th global conference in Bangkok in September 
2007. While initially only applying to fruits and vegetables, it now covers meat products and fish 
from aquaculture as well. It is currently implemented in more than 100 countries and covers 
94,000 suppliers worldwide with a growing membership every year.  
 
Instruments 
GlobalGAP consists of a set of normative documents. These documents include the General 
Regulations, the Control Points and Compliance Criteria (CPCC) Protocol and the Checklist. 
These are explained in some detail below.  
 
The general regulations set out the rules by which the standard is administered. This document 
describes the basic steps and considerations involved for the applicant to obtain and maintain 
GlobalGAP certification, as well as the role of producers, GlobalGAP and certification bodies. It 
consists of five different parts: (i) laying out some general information explaining what 
GlobalGAP is, describing the certification process, training etc., (ii) the certification body rules, 
containing important information for certification and accreditation bodies, (iii) the producer 
group certification, also known as option 2 (in contrast to option 1 which is individual 
certification), iv) benchmarking which explains GlobalGAP certification for those rules that are 
found to be technically equivalent to GlobalGAP, and v) training regulations important for 
members who want to become approved GlobalGAP trainers or already are approved trainers. 
 
The CPCC Protocol is the standard with which farmers must comply and which are audited to 
verify compliance. This document is divided into modules, listing for each scope and sub-scope 
the control points, compliance criteria and the level of compliance required. The levels can be 
Major Must, Minor Must or Recommendation. Completion and verification of a checklist 
consisting of 254 questions is required in order to acquire GlobalGAP certification (see below). 
Control Points include the following: record keeping and internal self-assessment/internal 
inspection, site history and site management, workers’ health safety and welfare, waste and 
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pollution management, recycling and re-use, environment and conservation, complaints, and 
traceability.3  
 
Checklists are used by farmers to fulfil the annual internal audit requirement and also form the 
basis of the farmers’ external audit. They replicate the Control Points in the CPCC, and are 
therefore also composed of modular sections. There are three checklist types in GlobalGAP: 
a) The checklist used for inspecting producers, which contains all the Control Points. It must be 
used during inspections by the Certification Board and can also be used by the producer/group 
when performing self-assessments. This checklist is divided into 41 “major musts”, 122 “minor 
musts” as well as 91 recommendations (“shoulds”). 
b) The Quality Management Systems Checklist used for auditing producer group Quality 
Management Systems (QMS). The producer group can also use this checklist when performing 
internal QMS audits. 
c) The Benchmarking Cross-Reference Checklist (BMCL) or the Approved Modified Checklist 
(AMC) used by applicant scheme owners applying for benchmarking against GlobalGAP to show 
equivalence.  
 
In addition to these normative documents, guidelines for dealing with general interpretation and 
application of Control Points and guidelines dealing with specific geographic and cultural 
differences also exist. These need to be approved and issued by the relevant Sector Committee 
(SC), with support from the recognised GlobalGAP National Technical Working Groups. Where 
necessary, the SCs combine interpretations common to national interpretation guidelines to 
develop a global guideline. All normative documents, as well as additional guiding documents are 
available free of charge on the GlobalGAP website (www.globalgap.org). The GlobalGAP 
standard is subject to a three year revision process to take into account technological and market 
developments. 
 
Membership  
GlobalGAP membership consists of three groups: retailers and food service members, suppliers 
and associate members (see Table 1). Membership has varied during the years, with new members 
joining in and some dropping out (see also van der Grijp et al. 2005). At the moment, the 
geographic coverage of the standard is universal. Europe, however, clearly dominates in all three 
categories. Especially in the retail sector it represents almost 93 percent of the members. In the 
other two categories, the percentage of European presence is slightly lower, with 72 percent of the 
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supplier members and 63 percent of the associate members. In total, Europe represents 72 percent 
of total GlobalGAP membership.  
 
Membership in SCs reflects that trend as well. More specifically, there are three sector 
committees: crops, livestock and aquaculture. In the crops committee, until 2009 20 out of 25 
members were European, representing 80 percent of the membership. Non-European members 
were from Chile, Brazil (2), South Africa and Japan. In 2009, membership changed dramatically, 
however. Specifically, 15 out of 24 members are European dropping the percentage to 62.5 
percent. New geographic coverage developed as well with members from USA, Kenya, South 
Africa and New Zealand joining. Uruguay and an additional member from Chile joined as well 
thus increasing Latin American participation. In the livestock committee, 13 out of 16 members 
are European, representing 81.25 percent. Here non-European membership declined and European 
participation increased even further. Specifically, 12 out of 13 members (92.3 percent) are now 
European. The only non-European member is from Uruguay. Finally, the aquaculture committee 
is completely Europe dominated. Moreover, Germany, Netherlands and the UK are 
overrepresented. This situation remained the same in 2009.  
 
Table 1. Membership of GlobalGAP 2009 
Continent Retailer and  Food 
Service member 
Supplier member Associate member Total 
Africa 
Asia 
Australia and New Zealand 
Europe 
Middle East 
North America 
Latin America 
Total 
0 
1 
0 
40 
0 
2 
0 
43 
9 
4 
3 
114 
3 
9 
15 
157 
6 
10 
3 
66 
1 
8 
11 
105 
15 
15 
6 
220 
4 
19 
26 
305 
Source:www2.gobalgap.org (17.09.09) 
 
Governance Structure 
Governance is conducted by a Board, whose decisions are based on a structured consultation 
process (see Figure 1).  The Board constitutes an equal number of elected producer and retailer 
representatives and is chaired by an independent chairperson. In March 2006, a number of SCs 
were established which discuss and decide upon product and sector specific issues. All 
committees have 50 percent retailer and 50 percent producer/supplier representation. In 2007, the 
SCs replaced the Technical and Standards Committee (TSC).  
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The SC members are elected for a period of three years by their peers (Supplier and Retailer 
GlobalGAP members). The SCs mostly work independently from the Board, but within the policy 
framework created by the Board. They are responsible for technical decision-making relevant to 
their sector, while being supported and guided by the GlobalGAP Secretariat to aid consistency 
and harmonization. Ultimately, the Board adopts standards developed or revised by the SCs. The 
SCs also operate as consultative bodies and from time to time may be requested by the 
GlobalGAP Board to deal with any specific matters that require product or sector input.  
Figure 1. Governance Structure of GlobalGAP  
 
 
Source: Globalgap News, September 2009, p. 8.  
The work of the Board and Committees is supported by FoodPLUS GmbH, a non-profit limited 
company based in Cologne, Germany, fulfilling a secretariat function for GlobalGAP. The 
executive management of FoodPLUS GmbH, i.e. its Managing Director, bears responsibility for 
the implementation of policies and standards. Financial and legal ownership and responsibility for 
FoodPLUS GmbH is held by the EHI Retail Institute via its 100 percent subsidiary EHI-
Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH. The EHI Retail Institute also operates the European Retail 
Academy, a global network of research institutes linked to retail activities and topics.  
Next to the main governing bodies, GlobalGAP has established National Technical Working 
Groups (NTWG) to facilitate implementation of global regulations locally. Their role is to 
develop a series of national interpretation guidelines as well as address specific local adaptation 
and implementation challenges. NTWGs are established voluntarily by GlobalGAP members in 
countries where there is a need for clarifying GlobalGAP implementations on a local scale. The 
guidelines developed by this growing number of groups are approved by the SCs and are 
published on the GlobalGAP website. The groups are established and work in close cooperation 
with the GlobalGAP Secretariat and the SC and support the GlobalGAP implementation and 
continuous improvement based on specific area needs.  
Board 
Secretariat Integrity Surveillance  
Committee 
Sector 
Committees 
Certification Body 
Committee 
National Technical 
Working Groups 
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Finally, GlobalGAP is associate body member of the International Accreditation Forum, hereby 
supporting the objectives of international accreditation to ISO guidelines. To manage the specific 
technical feedback coming from more than 100,000 audits worldwide, GlobalGAP has 
implemented a Certification Body Committee (CBC). Its main function is to harmonize the 
interpretation of the compliance criteria set by the SCs, as well as discuss GlobalGAP 
implementation issues and provide feedback. Moreoever, CBC represents the GlobalGAP-
approved Certification Bodies’ activity within the GlobalGAP system.  
 
The CBC is composed of experts employed by Certification Bodies that are GlobalGAP associate 
members and ISO Guide 65 accredited to at least one GlobalGAP scope. Members are elected by 
their peers (Certification Bodies that are GlobalGAP members) for a three year period. The CBC 
is supported and facilitated in its work by the GlobalGAP Secretariat. Any proposals for change 
that have been put forward by the CBC need to be finally approved by the SCs.  
 
III. Effectiveness 
In private forms of governance, effectiveness is a crucial criterion for their legitimacy as it is 
frequently identified as their claim to legitimacy. Private actors, after all, are not elected to 
political office, providing them with the authority to set rules and determine the societal allocation 
of values. Rather than drawing authority from democratic elections and formal office, legitimacy 
claims of private rule setting tend to derive from the notion that it can provide certain governance 
functions more effectively and efficiently than elected public actors.  
 
Following Easton, effectiveness can be measured along three dimensions: output, outcome and 
impact (Easton 1965; Fuchs 2006). The particular standard can be considered as output. The 
actual change in business conduct achieved in the course of a standard’s implementation, i.e. 
contribution to problem-solving, represents the outcome. The general change resulting from the 
interaction with additional economic, social and political externalities is the impact. The question 
about the effectiveness of private governance has to refer to changes in business conduct achieved 
in the course of the implementation of the agreed standard (outcome).  This outcome is a function 
of the agreed standard (output) and of existing incentives and opportunities to meet the standard, 
to outperform it or to fail to comply (Fuchs 2006). After all, not only the regulations defined by 
the private standard are of interest here. Rather, the implementation of the private standard and the 
change in actual conduct achieved by that implementation matters. At the same time, the private 
regulation cannot be held responsible for simultaneous developments in complex socio-economic 
systems, at least not by itself. 
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From the Perspective of the GlobalGAP 
GlobalGAP presents itself as a comprehensive standard covering food safety and sustainability 
requirements in conventional agriculture chains. Effectiveness, in the perspective of GlobalGAP, 
means increasing coverage and delivering consistent output through benchmarked schemes and 
auditing mechanisms.GlobalGAP reports extensively on its outcome in terms of certified 
producers. In 2008, GlobalGAP had 94,000 certified producers, up from 18,000 in 2004, 
representing an increase of approx. 80 percent. More than 20 countries joined in 2008. In total, 
over 85 countries are represented. There is significant growth within European countries, 
particularly due to French and German supermarkets managing to reach out to more producers 
(Annual Report 2009, 21.09.09). Significant growth is also seen within countries that hold a 
(major) global supply position in produce, mainly South Africa and Chile. Smaller growth is 
observed in Central and Eastern Europe, Central America and some African countries (ibid.). The 
majority of producers (67 percent) opt for a group certificate.  
 
Impact is referred to mainly as providing more producers with access to the market. GlobalGAP 
holds a series of “success stories” where it presents its social and market impact including the 
launching of new certificates, pilot projects, and corporate social responsibility initiatives. As 
these stories reflect selected cases, they do not represent the overall GlobalGAP performance, 
however. Moreover, such reporting is voluntary and has not undergone external evaluations.  
 
From the Perspective of Sustainable Development and International Development Standards 
A look at GlobalGAP from the outside reveals that its effects on (sustainable) development are 
highly ambivalent. Research has shown it to be somewhat effective at improving food safety. This 
effect mainly exists for consumers in Northern countries, however, and even here not all health 
scares have been avoided.  
 
Most importantly from the perspective of (sustainable) development, the GlobalGAP carries 
potentially highly damaging consequences for food security in developing countries (Fuchs, 
Kalfagianni, and Arentsen 2009). In particular, the high costs of implementation and certification 
of the standard are difficult afford for small farmers in developing countries (FAO 2006; 
Hatanaka et al. 2005). Without such certification, however, these smaller farmers have little 
chance of selling their products in the global market, as the global food retail market is highly 
oligopolistic and most major retail chains demand GlobalGAP certification (or similar standards). 
The consequences of GlobalGAP for food security, the most fundamental development issue, are 
very problematic then. 
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In terms of environmental consequences, the effects of GlobalGAP are ambivalent as well. While 
the standard does address some environmental issues – in contrast to a variety of other private 
standards, which only focus on food safety – the issue coverage is selective. In addition, many 
environmental concerns are only recommendations, and non-compliance does not prevent 
certification (Fuchs, Kalfagianni, and Havinga 2010; Van der Grijp et al. 2005). Accordingly, the 
environmental benefits of the GlobalGAP are much smaller than the rhetoric of GlobalGAP and 
its associated retailers suggests and Northern consumers are likely to believe. 
 
Tracing developments in the standard allows determining how these issues have fared over time. 
GlobalGAP publishes a new version of the standard every three years to account for technological 
and market developments. The most recent one is the 2007 version, which replaces those of 2004 
and 2001. Thus a comparison of the different versions reveals the shift in the weights among the 
different criteria represented in GlobalGAP.  More specifically, issues related to record keeping 
and internal self-inspection have been reinforced between 2001 and 2004. Likewise, hygiene 
requirements have also been strengthened. Issues related to environmental well-being, however, 
have been weakened. Specifically, quality of irrigation water (except for sewage water which is a 
major must in both versions), recycling and re-use, impact of farming on the environment and 
wildlife and conservation policies, while constituted minor musts in 2001, are mere 
recommendations in 2004 and remain so in 2007.  
 
Issues related to worker health and safety also lost status in 2004, from minor musts to 
recommendations. Issues related to worker welfare have been reduced from 10 to 3, in 2004.  Two 
of them, however, have acquired minor status (before they were recommendations). Specifically 
those related to identifying a member of management responsible for worker health and safety and 
welfare issues and the habitability of on-site living quarters including basic services and facilities 
for rural workers.  
 
Significantly, in 2007, an emphasis on worker welfare has been reintroduced. Recommendations 
regained their minor status, while some major points have been added. In August 2008, 
GlobalGAP introduced The GlobalGAP Risk Assessment on Social Practice (GRASP). It is 
designed to run for 18 months, covering regional adaptation and implementation in at least four 
pilot projects. The first pilot project was scheduled for November 2008 in Spain. Other regions 
like Latin America, Africa and Asia will follow in 2009. GRASP contains 14 criteria based on 
ILO conventions. It is not a full social audit and does not replace such an approach. GRASP rather 
is a tool that helps implementing a Social Management System in mainstream agriculture. Its 
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findings can serve to assess whether a full social audit may be necessary. Importantly, the GRASP 
assessment will NOT form part of the accredited certification. The GRASP Assessments are 
conducted on a voluntary basis.4 However, when a GRASP Assessment is conducted, its results 
will be made visible in the GlobalGAP database. The first GRASP training is scheduled to take 
place on October 31st, 2008, in Madrid, Spain.  
 
Waste and pollution management, which were reduced to recommendations in 2004, experienced 
some changes too. Identification of waste and pollutants regained their minor status. The 
provision “all farms must be clear of litter and waste” now has become a major must. The other 
three requirements remain recommendations. The Environment and Conservation Control Points 
remain recommendations as well.  
 
In sum, the effectiveness of GlobalGAP from the perspective of general development 
requirements is far from satisfactory. Indeed, GlobalGAP serves the needs of Northern consumers 
(and thereby the needs of global retail corporations), and even those only to a limited extent. It has 
yet to prove positive effects for sustainable development in developing countries, however.  
 
 
Figure 2. Emphasis on Sustainability Issues within GlobalGAP 
Environment
14% Food Safety
58%
Animal 
Welfare
16%
Worker 
Health & 
Safety
12%
 
Source: Own representation of data from Globalgap News, October 2008, p. 21 
 
 
IV. Critiques of the GlobalGAP 
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Three main criticisms are associated with GlobalGAP. The first relates to the social impacts of the 
standard, particularly for small farmers in the South. As pointed out above, critical observers have 
argued that thousands of farmers are losing access to the market  due to the high costs associated 
with the implementation and monitoring of the standards, (Action Aid 2005).  The costs provide a 
particular challenge for small farmers with small economies of scale and limited access to credit.  
 
 
Taking into account these concerns, GlobalGAP has recently initiated a project to foster group 
certification for smallholders. The aim is to reduce external certification costs, such as inspection 
charges. This aim is to be reached via the centralization of  (e.g. pesticide controls), for instance, 
which would help groups of farmers to benefit from scale effects. Based on this possibility of 
suppliers to obtain group certification, GlobalGAP increasingly emphasizes its relevance 
particularly for smallholders. 
 
Moreover, the GlobalGAP has institutionalized a number of organizational measures for 
improving the situation of smallholders. The Standard Manager of GlobalGAP has to regularly 
inform the SCs about the progress of the CBC Smallholder Involvement. In May 2007, 
GlobalGAP has started the Smallholder Ambassador/ Africa observer project funded by the 
Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and the Department for International 
Development (DFID) to incorporate the interests of smallholders. The objective of this project 
was to provide feedback from smallholders to the SCs. In a second phase of the project, Stephen 
Mbithi was nominated to continue the project developing practical input for the standard 
reflecting the situation of smallholders. Further information can be obtained from the independent 
website www.africa-observer.info Since February 2008, the Smallholder Task-Force has been 
established. It is calling for constructive proposals regarding improvements of the certification 
rules for smallholders. 
 
Next to social concerns, GlobalGAP has attracted criticisms regarding its democratic legitimacy. 
An examination of the participation, transparency and accountability dimensions has revealed 
several aspects that need improvement (Fuchs and Kalfagianni 2010). As shown above, 
participation, even though equal for suppliers and retailers in the committees, is Europe 
dominated. Regarding transparency, several positive qualities have been identified including the 
public forum, etc. However, performance related transparency is weak and selective. Finally, the 
biggest concern, related to all private standards of course, is accountability. Internal accountability 
is provided to the standard’s shareholders through internal reporting and peer review mechanisms, 
and external accountability in the narrow sense through the auditing by external auditors. 
Accountability to the public, however, is lacking. It is also difficult to always ensure 
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accountability to the regulatees even though potential mechanisms of appeal exist. It is doubtful 
that farmers, particularly uneducated poor farmers, have the necessary knowledge and 
organizational capacities to challenge GlobalGAP. 
 
 A final critique is associated to the lowering of attention to a range of environmental concerns 
within GlobalGap, mentioned above. As many other food safety standards exist in food 
governance and GlobalGap is the only retail standard that pays some attention to sustainability, 
the lowering of the significance of various environmental criteria is unfortunate.  
 
 
V. Policy Recommendations and Strategies for Change 
GlobalGAP was not created as a development standards, i.e. with the interests of Southern 
farmers in mind. Rather, GlobalGAP was meant to reduce the economic risks for Northern 
retailers resulting from the potential for political consumerism. Northern consumers became 
increasingly sensitized to questions of food safety and to some extent the environmental 
externalities of food products and processes. Given the structural power retail corporations hold in 
today’s global food system, they were able to create and impose standards fulfilling their need of 
presenting good effort towards consumers. 
 
NGOs and scientists, however, soon highlighted the potentially highly adverse consequences of 
the GlobalGAP for food security (and a range of environmental issues), In this respect, though, 
retailers face a real dilemma.  They can reduce the costs of standard implementation only by 
lowering the criteria defined, which in environmental terms, however, are already too weak from 
the perspective of environmental NGOs, for instance. Yet, if the GlobalGAP takes the criticism 
towards its environmental performance seriously, implementation costs will rise even more, again 
potentially damaging the livelihoods of thousands of small farmers in developing countries. The 
GlobalGAP would only be able to avoid this consequence, then, if the prices paid to suppliers 
were raised along with the implementation costs. This, however, retailers are unwilling to do 
because of the fear of declining profits due to shrinking margins or lower sales. Yet, a 
fundamental improvement in the situation is not possible otherwise. 
 
Given that retailers, who still dominate decisions within GlobalGAP, are unlikely to pursue the 
above strategy on their own, a public framing of private food retail governance is necessary. Such 
a public governance frame will have to ensure that the social externalities created by such private 
regulation have to be addressed, if not internalized. NGO pressure and scientific studies were 
sufficient to force GlobalGAP to start addressing the questions of developing country, and 
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especially smallholder, representation in its governance structures, as well as of certification costs. 
These efforts may well help improve some of the weaknesses of GlobalGAP in terms of its effects 
on sustainability mentioned above.  
 
However, the efforts undertaken in this respect fail to promise the solution of the fundamental 
problem identified above. Clearly, group certification as well as support of small holder 
certification by international and development organizations, such as the FAO or GTZ, or even 
individual corporations such as Starbucks, has helped in some cases with respect to certification 
costs. Food products, which are produced under high environmental and social standards, 
however, will have to have a certain price. Current market dynamics with the concentration of 
economic power in the hands of Northern retailers and consumers are unlikely to foster the 
development of such prices without government intervention.  
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